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U.S. Department of the
Interior
Minerals Management Service
Gulf of Mexico OCS Region
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Safety Alert No. 231
31 May 2005 |
Contact:
Glenn Woltman
(504) 736-2438
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Human Engineering Factors Result in Increasing
Number of Riser Disconnects
A significant number of
accidental riser disconnects have been experienced in deepwater operations
during the last five years. Each event had the potential for causing serious
well-control issues.
After the first incident in 2000, MMS issued a Notice to Lessees and
Operators (NTL),
No. 2000-G07, which clarified 30 CFR 250.107 (a) and 250.400 (July 2002) and
prescribed measures to prevent the accidental disconnect of the lower marine
drilling risers from floating drilling rigs. The NTL addressed ergonomic
measures to prevent human error and offered measures focused on technological
improvements.
Since the issuance of this NTL, nine accidental drilling riser disconnects and
one accidental production riser disconnect have occurred. Two riser disconnects
have occurred thus far in 2005. Investigation results indicate human error as
the cause for both incidents.
Human error contributed to over 50 percent of the total number of
events. Failure to implement the written operating procedures to function-test
the lower marine riser package (LMRP) and the BOP stack while in the moon pool
or prior to water entry has resulted in many of these events. Historical
information is provided in the attached table.
The MMS recommends that you review NTL No. 2000-G07, which states in part the
following:
a.
Lock out any LMRP disconnect that is not part of a sequential disconnect
process before the BOP/LMRP enters the water (ensuring that a well is secured by
blind or blind-shear rams before the riser disconnects).
b.
Ensure that the sequential LMRP disconnect process, including the
isolation of the wellbore, is designed so that the LMRP can be disconnected only
as the result of a deliberate act.
c.
Ensure that human engineering measures such as labeling the panel button
are clearly distinguishable from other functions, and fit LMRP and wellhead
connector functions with securable protective covers.
d.
Remove confusing metal tags temporarily used to identify functions, as
they may have been incorrectly placed. Rely on stamped receptacle
identifications to ensure that the control circuits on the wellhead or LMRP
connectors have not been disturbed. The subsea engineer must first ensure that
proper Subsea Function Test Checklist Procedures are in place, and then observe,
verify, and document all function testing of the BOP’s in the moon pool.
e.
During BOP function and pressure testing on the stump, all functions
should be operated through the test stinger to confirm the hoses are installed
appropriately on both pod receptacles.
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